**Introduction:**

In this paper I will review the change initiative launched in 1998 meant to change the approach of the law enforcement and intelligence community so that the United States would be protected from terrorism. My perspective is that this initiative failed due to the most deadly and devastating terrorist attack in American history occurring on September 11th, 2001. In this paper we will review the goals of the initiative, the key players, the target, applicable theories, and analysis of failure.

**Part I: Background of the Initiative**

After the fall of the Soviet Union the, perceived, most significant threat to the United States became non state and state funded terrorist groups. To combat this new threat, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive/ NSC – 62. This directive stated that the new threat required a new integrative approach between the intelligence and law enforcement communities, the state department, and the other governmental bodies. At its most fundamental level it aimed to create new processes and policies that utilized the strengths and resources of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State department to combat terrorism.

With overwhelming military superiority on the battlefield, the perceived new way to damage the United States and its citizens was through terrorist means. These could be attacks on vital infrastructure, US troops and citizens abroad, and community special events (Clinton, 1998). Similarly, disruptions to transportation systems or impeding continuity of government were perceived terrorist tactics (Clinton, 1998). The United States Intelligence and Law enforcement communities of that time were not set up to fight such an enemy. Thus, success against would require a new doctrine.

To implement this, a new position was created, which reported to the National Security Advisor (NSA), but with access to the president (Clinton, 1998). The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism which was filled by Richard Clarke. When he took the position in 1998, he had been in public service working for either the state department or the intelligence community for 25 years. He is an expert in the field with a personality based mostly on values with some cognitive elements. His values were based on his mission to provide security for the people of the United States. He pursued goals related to this value with relentlessness. Also, his cognitive ability should be rated as medium to high, as he did display an ability to logically analyze problems and create well-reasoned solutions. For this paper he should be considered our primary change agent.

As a direct report to the NSA and with access to the president, he had significant power and influence. The heads of the intelligence and law enforcement did not officially report to him, but the influence and power afforded to him did give him significant authority. However, under the Bush administration in 2000, this power and influence was reduced as all presidential access was rescinded and the new NSA did not favor him. Therefore, from 2000 to 2001 his power was significantly reduced.

He had a significant challenge as the target demographic of the change initiative was the entire intelligence and law enforcement community. The culture of both communities was characterized as unwilling to share, bureaucratic and dogmatic. This led to an overall toxic culture fueled by competition for resources. Due to this, the different missions of each department and the complex processes for moving information within the department, both communities were unwilling to be a part of the initiative in any real way other than shallow compliance. This would prove to be a problem as the lack of effective work within each community would lead to a terrible consequence. Thus, showing that the two communities had a large amount of control over the effectiveness of the change initiative. Perhaps more than the change agent.

**Part II: Theories to be applied**

In this section I will review three theories that I believe are applicable to this initiative. They provide an understanding for why the change initiative failed and can be used to theorize a potential solution in hindsight (This content will be in section III). The three theories are:

1. Attraction Selection Attrition Theory
2. Roger's Theory for the diffusion of innovation
3. Tactics of Implementation by Paul C Nutt

Each of these theories will be described so that proper context can be given so application is clearly understood.

Attraction selection attrition or ASA theory is based on an individual's perspective on how well they "fit" within an organization. Fit is based on several factors: Personality, values and workstyle (Roloff, 2020). These factors can manifest themselves in certain professions or an organization's culture and structure (Roloff, 2020). If the profession and/ or the culture's values and workstyle is aligned with the individual, the happier and more productive the individual will be.

However, there are several different types of fit. It is a continuum versus diametric opposites. No one person either fits or not, there are degrees. The types of fit are: strong, dynamic, weak, maverick and misfit (Roloff, 2020). Strong is the extreme where fit is very high, and misfit is the other extreme where fit is low.

Strong fit is where there is strong alignment between the individual and the organization (Roloff, 2020). There is a high amount of uncompensated labor or organizational stewardship and productivity (Roloff, 2020). These individuals comprise 30% of the population of an organization on average (Roloff, 2020). Dynamic fit is where there is relatively strong alignment between the individual and the organization, but not to the degree as the previously mentioned category. There is occasional uncompensated labor and energy outside the scope of tasks the individual is appointed, but not as much as with strong fit individuals. These individuals comprise 76% of the organization's population on average (Roloff, 2020). Further down the spectrum are the weak fit individuals. These individuals comprise 14% of the organization's population on average and are not strongly aligned with the organization (Roloff, 2020).

The Mavericks comprise 5% of the population on average and are the most interesting category in that they are the most open to change initiatives as they seek to challenge the status quo. Due to this desire to challenge the status quo, they can at times feel as if they don't fit even though they are committed to the organization's success (Roloff, 2020). Then finally are the misfits. These individuals are not aligned with the organization and comprise 5% of the organization's population on average (Roloff, 2020). These individuals may have the capability to do the job, but do not do it in such a way as the organization deems effective. The coping methods for misfits are to either, find a new job within the organization where they align, focus on the good aspects of the job, or pretend to go along with what is expected. The last method is what will be focused on in section III.

Now that we have a basic understanding of the types of fit, we have to understand the process by which an individual becomes attracted to an organization, how that organization selects them, and how they are retained.

The Attraction step is where the individual first encounters the organization. Initially the individual has no knowledge about the organization. In order to gain the information necessary to judge fit, the individual has two options. Advertisements and interpersonal communication with other individuals inside the organization (Roloff, 2020). Advertisements and related materials tend to be very inaccurate in describing the organization's culture and interpersonal sources tend to be more accurate, but not significantly (Roloff, 2020).

Individuals are first attracted to organizations due to perceived fit based on the information attained through one or both channels. However, there is room for error as it is not a guarantee that an individual can make a subjective judgement of all the aspects of their character and how they will align with the organization. Similarly, the sources of information, as stated previously, are not always accurate. This is one of the reasons why there are individuals within organizations that are a weak fit or misfits.

Now that the individual is interested in the organization, they must be selected. This is where the organization judges the fit of the individual. This is where the interview process comes into play. There are several aspects to the interview, but what we will focus on for this paper is the selection method, and it's effectiveness.

The selection method is an interview utilizing a recruiter. The recruiter is the agent of an organization and can be a very good assessor of fit. Their ability to judge an applicant's fit is based on their experience and self awareness of their own biases (Roloff, 2020). The more time they spend in the organization, the more they become aware of organizational norms, values and personality variances of individuals in the organization. Therefore, they can detect these in individuals being screened for entry into the organization. Similarly, the more experience they have interacting with applicants, they more able they become at detecting whether an applicant is lying or exaggerating facts (Roloff, 2020). A newer recruiter is likely to not be as accurate in identifying strong or dynamic fit individuals while a more experienced recruiter can be significantly more successful.

Recruiters can also be biased. Depending on the applicant's likeability, credentials, and physical attractiveness they can overlook certain other characteristics that may signal that the individual is a misfit (Roloff, 2020). This is something that will be discussed later in section III.

The final piece of ASA theory is attrition. This deals with whether an individual stays or leaves the organization and what might influence that. As we stated earlier there are different types of fit. If an individual has, for example, strong or dynamic fit, then the individual will remain with the organization, be productive, less stressed and happy overall with all other factors being equal (Roloff, 2020). If the individual does not fit with the organization one of two things can happen. Their stress increases and overall satisfaction decreases, or they become galvanized by being labeled a "misfit" (Roloff, 2020). This is not always seen however, and organization specific criteria are usually involved. Such as: seniority, tenure, redundancy, job knowledge, influence, power, etc…

Since ASA theory is based on fit, which is based on personality harmonization with an organizations culture and structure, it seems to be a good model which can lead to the creation of effective organizations. Communication is effective and conflict tends to be minimal. However, there is a downside to the fit model and that is Homogeneity (Roloff, 2020). Organizations that attract like-minded individuals can stifle innovation and creativity.

Which brings us to our next theory: Roger's theory for the diffusion of innovation. It is a more structural model that is based on five aspects: Knowledge of innovation and reinvention, external accountability, slack resources, organizational structure and permeable boundaries (Roloff, 2020). These five aspects appear to control how innovative an organization is going to be.

Knowledge of innovation and reinvention is the perception of the organization that the new idea can fit their needs (Roloff, 2020). Needs can be defined as QoQ (quarter over quarter) growth, sales targets, return on research investment, or KPI thresholds. If the organization is able to generate new ideas based on their own in house knowledge and understand that the new idea will allow them to reach a goal based on one or more of the above needs, then they may show innovative tendencies. We can reference fit here when discussing organizational knowledge. If we recruit individuals that value knowledge, then organizational knowledge generation may be higher. What is needed then is the idea generation aspect and implementation.

We see an example of this with Amazon. An organization that has high knowledge by utilizing data gathering, storage and analysis techniques. This knowledge is used to generate ideas to meet customer demand which drives revenue and sales growth which are organizational needs. We will apply a similar methodology to our specific example in section III.

External accountability is self-explanatory. How accountable is the organization to outside stakeholders? The higher the amount of external influence, the more innovative the organization will be (Roloff, 2020). The pressure to perform and market factors combine to create substantial internal pressure to transform knowledge into ideas that achieve results which satisfy organizational needs quickly. We see this phenomenon with publicly traded companies like Amazon. Other organizations that have less external pressure to perform have lower results as the accountability factor is lessened greatly.

The next aspect is organizational slack. Meaning how much resource outside of need is available to use. The greater the resource available up to a certain point tends to drive innovation within organizations. We can think of this in terms of dollar values. When budgets are set, if the annual revenues are higher indicating a surplus, we can then use this to re-invest into the business with more R&D dollars, hiring, or new products. An organization can be riskier than when revenues are in line or deficit the budget. However, if there are too many resources available, then this can also tend to stifle innovation (Roloff, 2020). The company can become too risky and not do the proper vetting of ideas. Meaning that the relationship between knowledge, idea, and business need is not properly explored or weak.

Now we must mention structure. Organizational structure is broken up into three parts: complexity, formalization and centralization (Roloff, 2020). Structural complexity is the number of professions or departments within an organization (Roloff, 2020). We can think of these as silos to use a more commonly known term. For any given task, if there are a high number of individuals or processes needed to accomplish it, we can call this organization complex. This can increase the amount of innovation, but reduce implementation (Roloff, 2020). More people have input on their specific piece of the task being done, but implementation requires a greater consensus of people to put the idea into place. The latter is therefore much more difficult.

Structural formalization is the existence of rules, routines or processes. The higher the amount of these three aspects the more able the organization is to implement changes, but the less likely it is to be innovative. We can bring the ASA model into this. Individuals who tend to follow the rules and adhere to routines, tend to not be creative. Therefore, we can assume that organization with high numbers of rules, regulations, routines and processes will be made up of individuals with those same personality traits. Therefore, they will be less innovative. However, since those same personality types have clear processes and rules which are followed diligently, changes can very quickly be implemented.

The last sub aspect of organizational structure is centralization. This is the degree to which an organization centralizes it's decision making and control points. Meaning, does all the power lie in concentration, or is it dispersed amongst the organization. Organizations with high centralized tend to implement initiatives fast but tend to be less innovative. This is due to the lag time between when an idea is proposed to meet a need, and the result of the decision. Innovative people want to act quickly and have their ideas to be implemented. In a centralized structure, the lag time tends to be longer and the screening of ideas tends to be more stringent. This is the opposite in a dispersed non centralized organization. Resources are freer and decision-making power can reside within closer proximity to the person suggesting the idea thus increasing the chance it will be approved. However, once it is approved, then consensus of the whole organization is needed. Hence implementation will stall.

The last and more interesting aspect is permeable boundaries. A permeable boundary relates to how difficult it is to get quality information into the organization so that it can generate or implement new ideas and it is broken up into three parts. Diversity of hiring, environmental monitoring and networks (Roloff, 2020). Diversity of hiring relates to the individuals being brought into the organization. Diversity of thought, race, values, etc. High diversity drives innovation. We can again reference

ASA theory here. If an organization is diverse, communication tends to be less efficient and conflict is more widespread (Roloff, 2020). However, these organizations are more innovative. The lack of homogeneity is a key aspect of driving innovation.

Environmental monitoring is more complex. It relates to organizational self-awareness. If the organization is aware of what it's competitors, or other actors are doing it is more able to adopt or modify new ideas to more effectively operate and/ or compete (Roloff, 2020). Structurally this may take the form of a marketing, governmental relations or forecasting team within an organization (Roloff, 2020). They seek to understand how the organization operates relative to the rest of the players in the ecosystem and where the opportunities are.

The final sub aspect of permeable boundaries is networks. This is the most complex as there are two types of networks: Formal and informal. Formal networks are primarily based on roles and are seen in roles which interface with actors outside the organization. Like in procurement or sales. Buyers interface with suppliers and can absorb innovative ideas from them. Sales personnel interface with customers and can similarly absorb innovative ideas from them. Informal channels are different in that they can, not only bring information into the organization, but they can increase or decrease the likelihood of adoption.

A permeable boundary is a good thing for information to come in and spur new idea generation and implementation. However, to maintain organizational identity it is necessary for this boundary to have some stiffness. If an organization is too open to new ideas and experimentation it can become overextended and fail.

As can be seen, for an organization to be innovative it must have: knowledge of innovation and reinvention, external accountability, slack resources, organizational structure and permeable boundaries. When it comes to slack resources, org structure and permeable boundaries, there is a balance that has to be struck. Either extreme can stifle innovation, but a proper balance can drive it effectively. We can also see that implementation is a huge factor. Which is the subject of our final theory.

Tactics of implementation by Paul C Nutt cover how the different approaches to implementing an initiative. There are four categories, but this paper will only focus on three. They are: implementation by intervention, implementation by participation and implementation by edict. They each have different definitions and success rates.

Implementation by intervention is a direct approach where a key executive with power directly drives an initiative. They have the authority to appraise performance and make necessary changes as the initiative goes (Roloff, 2020). They are bought in to the change, so they are able to identify areas of improvement, demonstrate feasibility and focus on results (Roloff, 2020). They then utilize data or other indicators to recognize improvement and continually monitor performance (Roloff, 2020). This approach is around 100% successful, but only utilized in 20% of cases (Roloff, 2020).

Implementation by participation is where a stakeholder or stakeholders take responsibility for implementing an initiative (Roloff, 2020). The primary stakeholder or sponsor delegates authority and creates a list of parameters that have to be complied with while implementing (Roloff, 2020). The delegated stakeholder then identifies methods to execute the initiative and makes recommendations to the primary stakeholder or sponsor. A decision is rendered and then must be implemented by the

delegated authority. However, the delegated authority must implement this initiative by facilitating cooperation with other participating parties (Roloff, 2020). While being studied, this method was shown to be 75% effective, but only utilized 17% of the time (Roloff, 2020).

Implementation by edict is the final approach within Nutt's theory that we will discuss for this paper. This method is rather straightforward. Idea is generated at the top and issued. Compliance is demanded by the higher authority and there is no attempt made to persuade, or carry through by cooperation. This method was only 43% effective and utilized in 23% of cases.

Nutt's theory in combination with the other two theories we have discussed can aid in understanding the relationship between culture, innovation and implementation. These three key aspects will be important in understanding how the intelligence community reacted, and how they might have acted differently in combatting terrorism and possibly preventing 9/11.

**Part III: Change Management Plan**

In this section I will review the change initiative in more detail and apply the three previously mentioned theories. First the change initiative goals will be reviewed from an instrumental, relational and face perspective. Then the obstacles will be analyzed and reviewed utilizing applicable theories. Finally, we will define success, and assess risk, cost and probability of success. With our specific example we will first review why the initiative failed, then in the theory section, discuss possible remedies that could have led to success.

*Change Goals:*

The overall goal of the change initiative was to change the approach to which the law enforcement community and intelligence community did their jobs which would keep the United States safe. A structural change with instrumental and relational goals. However, there were no clear face goals. Within this broad initiative separate departments each had different objectives to fulfill. There were many goals in the document, but we will focus on the three believed to be the most important to review and the biggest contributors to the failure of the initiative. These are:

- Disruption of terrorist networks which was to be led by the CIA (Clinton, 1998).

- Prosecuting terrorists and keeping them out of the United States which was to be led by the FBI (Clinton, 1998).

- Effective interagency coordination and collaboration to carry out the central goal of the initiative (Clinton, 1998).

The first two goals are instrumental and can be measured, although the actual number of networks disrupted could not be found, or when it was alluded to in other documents it was redacted. The number of foreign terrorist kept out was set at zero. The third goal was a relational goal, meaning that the relationship among departments had to change to be more integrative and collaborative to accomplish the overall objective.

Upon review, it is here that a mistake was made. A face goal should have been added addressing the nature of the relationships between departments and how to base them on mutual respect. This would naturally have to be based on solid

communication practices and the sharing of information. A solid face goal should have been to foster an environment of collaboration and information sharing by increasing cross departmental training, and interaction. Specifically, between the DIA, CIA, FBI and NSA. As the exact numbers of analysts, and types of interactions have been classified to a great extent, I cannot speculate as to a numerical goal, I can only generally state.

*Obstacles and Strategies to Counter:*

There were many obstacles to accomplishing the above goals, however we will only focus on three in order of importance. Organizational culture, organizational structure, and implementation approach. Organizational culture can be analyzed by using the ASA model. To analyze organizational structure, we can utilize Roger's diffusion of innovation and to understand implementation approach, we can utilize Nutt's research on implementation methods. These three theories can be used to understand and possibly combat each of these obstacles. Since these obstacles were directly responsible for the overall initiative's failure, in discussion, we will not refer to specific goals, but the overall goal of increased effective collaboration between the law enforcement communities and the intelligence communities to keep the United States safe.

In terms of organizational culture, there was substantial diversity among the different actors within the intelligence and law enforcement community. If we apply ASA theory to this we can understand why that exists. The values and personality of the FBI and the CIA's personnel were very different. The FBI valued apprehension and prosecution of terrorists using the justice system and the rule of law. Therefore, their personnel tended to be more aggressive, extroverted, and creative. The CIA valued a more cognitive and cerebral approach by gathering intelligence and disrupting terrorist networks. The personnel tended to be more passive, introverted and rule based. This opposition created friction and tension between two organizations. ASA theory backs this up as communication and conflict are more widespread within diverse groups. This led to a lack of trust between groups and the withholding of vital information.

ASA theory can also be applied to misfits or mavericks within the individual groups. A maverick within the FBI before 9/11 and the head of the New York City's counterterrorism unit was John O'Neil. He was an individual who was dedicated to the bureau's mission. So much so that he challenged the status quo and made many enemies. This led to him being pushed out of the FBI and taking a job as head of security at the World Trade Center. He was killed on 9/11 by the very terrorist plot he was trying to prevent, by the same man he was trying to catch during his time at the FBI.

Since we can apply ASA theory in this way, we can also make a recommendation to improve the situation. Shared roles with a common objective facilitate the development of mutual vales and personality types. This can be done through shared hiring and operating practices for similar and joint roles. An example is a cryptographic analyst who can speak Arabic. The role should have the same specifications and requirements for both the CIA and the FBI. From a cultural perspective the individual recruiter should be a cross trained employee who has worked with both the CIA and FBI. The individual hired, in theory, should

then be able to act as a bridge between both agencies and have personality aspects of both cultures. Over time, all other things being equal, this will facilitate better communication and less conflict. Breeding trust and better collaboration.

Now that we understand the underlying cultures, the structure of the overall organization must be analyzed. Specifically, the ability of the organization to be innovative. Innovation in this context is defined as: the ability to collaboratively work together in a new way to accomplish the goal of keeping the United States safe from terrorist attacks. By sharing information, new ideas can be generated and implemented to disrupt terrorist networks, foil attacks before they happen effectively and at speed. We can apply Roger's model here. Specifically, the section on organizational structure. The overall ecosystem of the intelligence and law enforcement community was (and still is) complex, formal and decentralized. The formal and complex aspects inhibit innovative behavior, and the decentralized aspect inhibits implementation of the few innovative ideas that are approved.

This was seen in the complex web of agencies that gather intelligence. The DIA, NSA and CIA are the primary intelligence gathering organizations, but intelligence is shared in a formal fashion versus informal. The DIA and NSA feed information to the CIA, and the CIA may pass information that it considered relevant to the FBI. However, due to the nature of intelligence, small fragments can be pieced together from other fragments gathered by another agency. Both pieces separate could be dismissed as gibberish, but combined are viable pieces of intelligence. An innovative idea. Due to the complex nature of gathering intelligence and the multiple agencies required, only information deemed relevant as w hole was passed on, which lead to mistakes. Such as when Khalid al-Mihdhar (9-11 hijacker) was known to be in the United States for a full year before September 11th.

The decentralized aspect was especially hurtful during the early days of the Bush presidency with Richard Clarke's position. In 1998 Richard Clarke did not have any direct authority over the agencies to drive the initiative he was charged with. But he did have influence which he could leverage to drive cooperation among the agencies in carrying out the initiative. He did achieve some success in getting the different agencies to engage, but when Bush was elected in 2000 this influence disappeared. Thus, the decentralized power structure robbed him of the ability to drive greater cooperation among the agencies he was working with.

We can use Nutt's theory on implementation to understand this. Specifically, implementation by edict, and participation. At first the implementation method was by participation. Clarke leveraged influence to drive interagency cooperation to a degree. However, the implementation method changed to by edict after Bush was elected. Clarke had little influence, could only follow up on performance and demand cooperation. This proved to be ineffective in driving interagency cooperation and contributing to the terrorist attacks on 9/11.

To combat this, we can apply Nutt's theory on implementation. The implementation by intervention approach should have been taken with Clarke being given direct control and authority over the agencies and resources to which he could attack the

issue of interagency cooperation directly. This in combination with a process change to gathering intelligence, based on an application of Roger's model of diffusion, would have possibly lead to a different result than 9/11.

Intelligence could continue to be gathered by different agencies, but that information should then be put into a pool and analyzed jointly. By taking advantage of the different organization's intelligence gathering capabilities, and reducing formality and increasing centralization, it could have possibly increased innovation and thus intelligence gathering effectiveness. When combined with Clarke taking an intervention approach to interagency cooperation, the intelligence could then have been actioned in a timelier fashion that could have stopped or reduced the severity of 9/11.

*Defining Success, Costs, and Risks of Countermeasures*

For this change initiative, the minimum level of success can be stated as the protection of the American homeland infrastructure, and citizens both home and abroad. The maximum level of success is the previously mentioned definition and in addition: the prosecution of terrorist leaders and the disruption and/or permanent dismantling of terrorist organizations abroad. These two definitions of success can be applied to both the original initiative which failed, and the changes proposed in this paper.

The risk is a direct consequence of what happened when the original initiative failed. On September 11th, the deadliest terrorist attack in US history occurred killing 2,977 people. In addition, a risk for the changes proposed in this paper is that something was not considered which leads to the intelligence community losing it's effectiveness leading to another terrorist attack and the loss of American lives or influence across the world. Perhaps by combining hiring practices or bringing agencies closer together we increase homogeneity and lose creativity which leads to another surprise attack. The only solutions to these issues, are to constantly improve and develop and implement initiatives and policy that take all facets into consideration (instrumental, relational and face saving).

The costs of these initiatives must be compared against potential losses. Not only in human life, but economic impact and time. There is only a finite number of dollars to be allocated to each of these initiatives and only a certain amount of time where a measure is preventative versus reactive. The best way to measure all this is ascertain what is going to have the largest effect. To me, the organizational culture is the largest issue that must be prioritized and implemented by intervention. If need be, organizational structure can wait.

If Organizational culture fix is prioritized, then the probability of success increases. It only becomes a matter of designing new processes around a trusting, well-functioning group of individuals and implementing it properly. However, if that is not in place, then the probability of success decreases dramatically.

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